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The present study had two main goals: (1) to investigate the difference between
perception and mental imagery using a visual illusion as a stimulus; (2) to inspect
gender related differences in perception and imagery. Our main hypothesis, that there
would be no differences between perception and mental imagery, was motivated by
previous neuroimaging data. Unlike these neuroimaging studies that demonstrate great
similarity between the two processes, results obtained in behavioral studies have not
always been consistent. We assumed that this inconsistency was a consequence of
methodological differences. Hence, we explored the two processes with a modified
behavioral procedure. The additional exploration of gender differences was motivated by
the discrepancy between our findings and the existing literature. In two experiments,
participants estimated the lines constituting the horizontal-vertical illusion, either in
perception or imagery task. Results confirmed that there was no significant difference
between perception and imagery: the illusion was equally strong in both tasks. In the
second experiment, an additional factor was tested, stimulus size. The results showed
that, although there was no significant difference in illusion strength, there was a gender
difference in the size of mental image for medium and large stimuli. While male subjects
performed equally in the two tasks, female subjects tended to underestimate size in the
imagery task. This tendency intensified as the stimulus size increased. Our results not
only inform us about the status of illusions in imagery but also offer some answers about
the spatial nature of mental representations. We hope that such precise measurements of
mental representation might provide better understanding of reasoning that uses mental
images.
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The attempt to understand mental imagery inspired a long
and famous debate. One camp, led by Stephen Kosslyn,
described imagery as mental representations analogous to
perceived stimuli (Kosslyn, 1973). The other camp, led by
Zenon Pylyshyn, theorized that mental images were in fact
decomposed into propositions and symbolic in nature (Pylyshyn,
1973). Converging evidence from cognitive neuroscience
supported the first proposal, systematically showing that the
brain areas used in visual mental imagery overlap with the
areas used for visual perception (i.e., cortical areas, such
as parietal and frontal; Kosslyn et al., 1997; Ganis et al.,
2004). Nevertheless, the results for primary visual areas were
not always consistent and sometimes showed differences
in activation for perception and imagery (Kosslyn et al.,
2001). Taken together, the ratio between studies showing
activation vs. no activation in primary visual cortex during
imagery are 21:3 for fMRI, 11:13 for PET and 2:7 for SPECT
studies. Further studies have shown that not only are these
areas active during imagery, but repetitive transcranial
magnet stimulation (rTMS) temporarily disabling V1, also
disrupts imagery, suggestive of a causal link (Kosslyn et al.,
1999).
Hence, overall neuroimaging studies demonstrated that the
same brain areas were involved in both tasks. Unfortunately, this
involvement might be a consequence of some other property
of the task (i.e., spatial layout of the visual mental images)
leaving the question of the similarity of underlying mechanisms of
the two phenomena still unanswered. Therefore only behavioral
tasks can establish similar phenomenology in imagery and
perception, confirming the similarity of processes. Experiments
using visual illusions as stimuli for imagery and perception proved
to be very useful in this respect. For example, demonstrating
that one can inspect an imagined “picture” to experience an
optical illusion in a similar way as in perception would show
the necessary similarity among the processes (Chambers and
Reisberg, 1985).
Visual illusions are often just simple geometrical
configurations, which generate percepts that do not fully
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represent physical properties of the stimulus. Typically, illusions
are not thought to be influenced by higher visual or cognitive
processes (Harris et al., 2011). In fact, illusions are still perceived
even when we know all about them. There is a general consensus
that illusions occur at a basic, low level of visual processing (for
earlier literature see also: Fisher, 1969; Robinson, 1972). It is thus
interesting to examine whether illusions also occur in imagery.
If illusions can be experienced in imagery, it might suggest that
imagery also uses basic low-level vision strategies. If illusions are
also of the same magnitude in imagery and perception, this could
be a strong indicator that the two processes share more basic
mechanisms.
Unfortunately, there were discrepancies in results obtained
using illusions as the stimuli in mental imagery tasks. While
some reported illusions formed in imagery (Berbaum and Chung,
1981; Wallace, 1984a,b; Ohkuma, 1986), others did not (Reisberg
and Morris, 1985; Giusberti et al., 1998). We believe that this
discrepancy is both a consequence of different methodologies
used in different studies and different criteria for successful
creation of illusion in imagery.
One of these studies (Wallace, 1984b), which provided
support for the existence of perceptual illusions in imagery
and the similarity of perception and imagery processes, like
ours investigated the horizontal-vertical illusion. In this study
participants were invited to observe the two lines creating
the illusion, imagine them, or would be presented with either
one of the stimuli lines and be asked to imagine the other.
They were instructed to imagine a line of the same size as
the presented line, but depending on a condition, sometimes
in the same and sometimes in the different orientation. The
participants were then asked to provide a magnitude estimate of
the illusion. The perception condition, with both stimulus lines
presented, showed stable illusory effect for all the participants
(1.9 cm difference on the 12 cm targets). The imagery results
divided the sample into two groups: (1) the group of gifted
imagers who systematically, though non-significantly, amplified
the illusion; and (2) the group of non-gifted imagers who could
not provide responses in any condition involving either full or
partial imagery.
As just mentioned, a typical procedure involved asking
participants to imagine two lines of equal length and then
inviting them to judge whether they are equal in length.1
Already Predebon and Wenderoth (1985) noted that a significant
methodological flaw of Wallace’s studies was an ambiguous
instruction. It seemed that the lines were “equal and not
equal” at the same time (Predebon and Wenderoth, 1985).
Moreover, this kind of instruction could be easily biased
by the experimenter’s suggestion or expectation, and would
seem to be the best candidate for explaining the discrepant
results.
1Original instruction (Wallace, 1984a, page 157): “. . .the subjects were told to
imagine a line of the same physical length as the horizontal one present and to
imagine their line as being located below the one that they could see. . . Can
you now tell me if the top line appears to be longer than the bottom line, if the
bottom line appears to be longer than the top line, or if the two lines appear
to be equal in length?”
A second and related problem was the conception of the
imagery task in the early studies. For example, in the just cited
studies by Wallace (1984a,b), participants were asked to estimate
an illusion that was partly presented (as a picture) and partly
imagined. In such a case, the illusion is a hybrid of two very
different processes: perception and imagery (or more precisely
memory, given that imagery is in fact a form of memory task).
At the time this hybrid procedure was successfully applied to, for
example, the autokinetic (Wallace, 1980), Poggendorff (Goldstein
and Weintraub, 1973) and Miller-Lyer illusions (Berbaum and
Chung, 1981). The dominant theory at the time was functional
equivalence theory (Finke, 1980), highly supportive of the
described procedure postulating an easy substitution of an image
(formed in imagery) for a physical stimulus. But to put it in
Finke’s own words “Effects produced when images are formed
are often smaller than corresponding effects produced when
objects and events are observed, and vivid imagers often show
larger effects when forming images than nonvivid imagers”.
This statement precisely characterizes results such as the one
previously described (Wallace, 1984b).
In our view, given such differences between perception and
imagery, the dual nature of the hybrid procedure is problematic
if we want to make really general claims about imagery process
vs. perception, claims about the entire population (not just gifted
minority) and especially if we want to measure the size of this
illusory effect in imagery per se. In addition, the following years
witnessed very different findings about the role of memory in size
representation and perception (Freyd and Finke, 1984; Intraub
et al., 1996). These studies demonstrated a more sophisticated role
of memory in size estimation (which will be further presented in
the Discussion and compared to our results).
Another general methodological issue has been high stimulus
complexity. Giusberti et al. (1998) used the Ebbinghaus illusion,
constructed of 14 circles in three different sizes and presented
partially in three successive frames. Participants had to unite
all of these separately presented elements into a single figure
in imagery. Firstly, it is not even known whether the mental
images could be accurately constructed and combined from
previously presented parts. But more importantly, how could
performance in perception and imagery be compared in this kind
of task?
When it comes to stimulus presentation and control, it should
be noted that the possible influence of afterimages on the results
was never considered nor controlled (like for example in the
domain of color, see Finke and Schmidt, 1977). The main
characteristics of experimental procedures include figures first
fully shown and then imagined (Giusberti et al., 1998), or figures
that are partly viewed and partly imagined (Wallace, 1984a,b;
Reisberg and Morris, 1985). Under such presentation conditions,
the occurrence of potentially distracting afterimages seems almost
inevitable.
In sharp contrast to the usual procedures in visual perception
experiments, the above studies used only illusory figures and did
not use any control stimuli. Furthermore, those stimuli were not
varied in size or any other relevant dimension, there was no
manipulation of key parts of the figure, and inevitable clustering
of answers in the same direction might well have occurred.
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And although we turned to behavioral research to gain a level
of understanding that neuroscience seemed unable to provide,
measurements used in these studies has failed to deliver a full
account of the nature of mental images. That is, only arbitrary
and relative measurements were used and the only evidence of
an illusory figure’s existence was subjective judgment. Participant
were either asked to decide whether the targets were equal or
bigger (Wallace, 1984a,b; Reisberg and Morris, 1985) or to make
a judgment based on arbitrary units (Giusberti et al., 1998).
Therefore, no direct quantitative measurement of imagined
targets has ever been obtained.2
Many of the results presented above were analyzed in relation
to scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
(VVIQ; Wallace, 1984a,b; Reisberg and Morris, 1985; Giusberti
et al., 1998). In those studies results were analyzed and explained
separately for high- and low-imagers. Given that we are trying
to establish the link between perception and imagery, this
conception of scoring can only lead to confusion. Not only is
there no analogous example in perception, but also observations
from these studies are unlikely to provide a general explanation of
imagery process.
We believe that the discrepancy among previous behavioral
studies is a consequence of the methodological problems we have
outlined. In the present study the methodology was modified and
the procedures were simplified, as listed below.
SIMPLIFIED, NON-AMBIGUOUS STIMULI
All of our stimuli were non-ambiguous and constructed of
simple straight lines. Initially, we started our experiments using
three famous illusions: the horizontal-vertical illusion, the Ponzo
illusion and Koffka’s illusion. However, analysis of pilot data
showed that only the first example was really non-ambiguous and
usable in our setup (this was already reported in the literature, see
Peterson et al., 1992). Therefore only this illusion will be presented
and analyzed in the current paper.
SIMPLIFIED IMAGERY TASK
We used an imagery task that avoided potential problems with
the construction of mental images. This task included only
visualization of previously presented stimuli. Moreover, the task
was constructed in such a way as to avoid the two issues that
previous research struggled with. Our stimuli were either viewed
or imagined, which prevented construction of hybrid images. This
further enabled the use of a simple matching scale, and a simple
psychophysical procedure in the experiment.
PRECISE MEASUREMENT ON A SCALE
For the first time in imagery research a matching scale was used,
providing not only quantitative measurement and well-defined
experimental procedures, but also avoiding previously used
paradoxical instructions. Finally, since the scale was used both
in perception and imagery it allowed for a simple quantitative
comparison between the formed percepts and mental images.
2This does not include the RT and accuracy studies, but reffers only to the
spatial characteristics of the the imagined illusions.
PREVENTION OF THE AFTERIMAGES
We used a white noise mask to avoid the potential influence of
afterimages. The presence of the mask also enabled us to run a
large number of independent trials and to collect a large number
of measurements for each target in each task.
COLLECTING DATA FOR BOTH HIGH- AND LOW-IMAGERS
Some of the previous studies used only so-called high-imagers,
that is, people gifted for mental imagery. However, in order
to expose the actual relation between perception and imagery
processes, we cannot restrict the population in only one of
the tasks. Our choice of stimuli proved optimal to satisfy this
condition, as all participants were able to imagine our stimuli
(which we additionally confirmed in the debriefing procedure).
WIDE VARIETY OF STIMULI
Introducing control sets of stimuli enabled us to control for
participants’ answering strategies. Namely, some participants,
when presented with a well-known illusion, might pretend that
it does not affect them and call the targets equal. However,
it is not possible to detect such answering strategy when the
targets are really physically equal. Furthermore, it prevents us
from distinguishing between this strategy and genuine absence of
illusion (which might happen in imagery task).
Consequently, we constructed two control sets of stimuli in
order to examine whether all participants followed experimental
procedure and to understand why some of the participants
did not report experiencing an illusion. Both control sets were
constructed in the same manner as illusions, but the crucial
geometrical parts involved in the illusory effect, were made
physically different sizes. This was done either in the direction of
the illusory effect, creating a first control set pseudo-illusions, or
in the opposite direction, creating a second control set distractors.
If participants reported “no difference” for control sets, we could
exclude them because they failed to follow the procedure.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-seven undergraduates (14 males and 13 females) from the
Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad, participated
in the experiment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision
and were naïve regarding the experimental hypotheses. They
received course credit for their participation and signed a consent
form prior to the beginning of the experiment.
Stimuli
Stimulus consisted of two black lines (44 mm long, 1 mm wide)
perpendicular to each other to create the horizontal-vertical
illusion (Figure 1, left). In the horizontal-vertical illusion those
two equal lines appear to have different length due to their
orientation (Avery and Day, 1969). Stimuli were presented on a
white background (dimensions 112× 88 mm).
Two control sets of the stimuli, made of physically different
lines, were also used. Pseudo-illusions (Figure 1, middle) had
the vertical line longer than the horizontal line (see Table 1), so
the stimulus was changed in the direction of the illusory effect.
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FIGURE 1 | Types of stimuli used in the study. Vertical line length was
varied in the case of pseudo-illusions and distractor.
As a result, the lines were not only perceptually different—the
vertical line was physically longer. If participants still reported
the two lines as equal, it would be a strong indicator of
answering following a “familiar with the illusion strategy”. Those
participants would be excluded from further analysis. Distractors
(Figure 1, right) on the other hand had a longer horizontal line
(see Table 1). Consequently, the figures did not look like the
horizontal-vertical illusion. They were used to avoid systematic
answering in the same direction and also to detect inattentive
participants.
Scale
A scale with vertical lines of 10 different lengths was used for
matching. The shortest line was 23 mm, and the longest line was
50 mm, with each line being 3 mm longer than the previous.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a completely dark room and
upon arrival each participant was seated 85 cm from the computer
screen. Their task was to match the size of the two lines that
produced the stimulus (such as those shown in Figure 1).
SuperLab pro 2.0 for Windows was used for stimulus
presentation and recording of responses. Stimuli were presented
on a calibrated computer screen (ViewSonic CRT PerfectFlatTM),
resolution 1152 × 864 pixels, frequency at 75 Hz). The stimulus
background was white, subtending 9.5◦ × 7.1◦ degrees of
visual angle, while the stimulus lines were 3◦ long. Participants
responded by pressing keys marked 1–10 on a regular computer
keyboard.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the
two experimental tasks: perception or imagery. For the two
different tasks we constructed appropriate demonstrations and
instructions. Instruction was followed by three practice trials.
In both tasks (perception and imagery), participants had to
match the size of the two stimuli lines to the lines on the scale
(Figure 2). That is, they had to choose one line from the scale
that looked as if it was the same size as the target. However, in the
perception task, the stimuli remained on the screen during the
matching, while in the imagery task stimuli were removed.
Farrell (1979) noticed that participants had some difficulty
distinguishing left and right targets on the screen. To test whether
this was the case with our participants too, prior to Experiment 1,
a pilot study was conducted with the aim of choosing the best
labels for the target lines. The results revealed that our participants
Table 1 | Size of lines for pseudo-illusion and distractor stimuli (in
millimeters).
Stim. No. Pseudo-illusions
Vertical Horizontal
1 50 47
2 38 35
3 47 38
4 32 29
5 26 23
Distractors
1 41 50
2 23 50
3 32 50
Stimuli size was always 44 mm.
also had difficulties with labels but did not make mistakes when
we used cue words in different colors. Therefore we used the
labels “up” in red and “down” in green to cue them as to which
part of the illusory figure they should match on a particular
trial.
In the perception task, the stimulus was first shown on
the upper part of the screen for 1000 ms, followed by the
cue word indicating which line of the figure needed to be
estimated (i.e., vertical or horizontal, labeled “up” and “down”
respectively, but there was no fixation point). The scale was
presented 500 ms later on the lower part and participants had
to perform the matching task (without any time limit). After
the matching task, the same procedure was repeated for the
other line. At the end of each trial, a white noise mask was
presented.
In the imagery task, stimuli were presented for 3000 ms, and
then were removed. Participants had to visualize it,3 and only then
they were cued which of the two lines will be estimated first (i.e.,
labels “up” and “down” would appear on the screen). During the
matching task, only the labels and the scale were presented on the
screen. The time for visualizing the figure was not limited.
During the whole trial, the participants were not asked to fixate
at any particular part of the screen.
The illusion was presented ten times during the session, while
pseudo illusion and distractor were shown two times. The order
of presentation was randomized for each participant.
Apart from control stimuli we also used an attention
test. Four times during the experiment, participants were
asked to specify whether they were supposed to estimate the
horizontal or vertical line first (i.e., “up” or “down”). That
is, after a specific trial, a probe question would appear and
the participants would have to report whether they were
judging horizontal or vertical lines on that trial. This would
help us establish if they were attending to each specific trial
task.
3The instruction was given in Serbian and the crucial part (“vaš zadatakc´e biti
da zamislite figuru koja vam je prethodno bila prikazana na ekranu”) could be
literally translated as “your task will be to imagine the figure that has just been
presented to you on the computer screen”.
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FIGURE 2 | The time sequence in the experimental trials. Upper
row shows the Perception task: both the stimuli and the measuring
scale were presented on the screen during the estimation. Lower row
shows the Imagery task: stimulus was removed after 3 s, and
participants had to inspect their mental image and estimate the size
on the presented scale.
Participants did the experiment individually, in the presence of
an experimenter. Each experimental session lasted about 25 min.
RESULTS
A control analysis was performed (on perception task data) to
assess responding strategies and possibly exclude participants
that had the tendency to pretend to see illusory figures as
composed of physically equal lines. Participants that did not use
any responding strategy should exhibit the following patterns
of results for: (1) pseudo-illusions, a significantly longer vertical
line; (2) illusions, a significantly longer vertical line; and
(3) distractors, no significant difference, or vertical line estimated
as longe.
One of the 27 subjects was excluded because she failed to
report the control stimuli correctly. The remaining 26 subjects
Table 2 | ANOVA results for difference analysis in Experiment 1.
Factors df df F p-level
Modality 1 257 0.589 0.443
Gender 1 257 2.252 0.135
Modality ∗ Gender 1 257 0.245 0.620
passed all the controls and scored 81% on the attention
test.
Their data were first analyzed using a two-way factorial
ANOVA of Modality (perception/imagery) and Gender
(male/female). The ANOVA was applied to the differences
between their horizontal and vertical matches, following previous
studies (Wallace, 1984a,b; Reisberg and Morris, 1985; Giusberti
et al., 1998). The results (Table 2) showed that there was no
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Table 3 | ANOVA results for size estimation in Experiment 1.
Factors df df F p-level
Modality 1 257 2.88 0.090
Gender 1 257 21.15 0.000∗
Line position 1 257 919.71 0.000∗
Modality * gender 1 257 3.56 0.060
Line position * modality 1 257 0.59 0.443
Line position * gender 1 257 2.25 0.135
Line position * modality * gender 1 257 0.25 0.620
* p < 0.01.
significant difference in illusion size for the factors Modality,
Gender, and their interaction. Critically, perception and imagery
produced the same magnitude of illusion, 86%, since (on average)
38 mm horizontals were matched to 44 mm verticals.
A different insight into the nature of these phenomena can be
obtained by using matches for each of the two lines separately
(i.e., analysis of size). A line-size-match is a typical variable in
psychophysical experiments, and it simply refers to the intensity
estimation of perceived (or imagined) stimuli. Permitting Line
orientation (horizontal, vertical) to be an additional factor, the
magnitude of the illusion was still independent of modality,
and there were no interactions, but gender now had an
effect.
The three-factors ANOVA showed the following results
(Table 3).
Results showed no significant interactions between Line
position, Gender and Modality (Table 3). Line position was
statistically significant confirming the presence of the illusion
(Figure 3). Most importantly, there was again no main effect
of Modality showing no difference between the perception
FIGURE 3 | The results for line estimations in the two tasks, perception
task on the left and imagery task on the right. Illusion strength is
independent of Modality. Horizontal and vertical lines (above the histogram)
denote the horizontal and vertical target lines in the stimuli.
and imagery task in respect to line size. A significant
main effect of Gender indicated that there are some gender
differences in general processing, but this does not vary as
a function of Modality or Line size (no interaction between
the factors Line position and Gender, or Modality and
Gender).
The stimuli size was 44 mm in all shown cases but judge
correctly only by the female participants when positioned
vertically (in both task modalities).
The lack of an interaction between Line position and Modality
indicated that the illusion intensity was independent of modality:
FIGURE 4 | Results in Experiment 1 (analysis of size). The
estimation on the left graph depict the data for the vertical line
which is estimated statistically significantly longer than the horizontal
line, presented on the right portion of the graph. The two lines on
each graph present the two task: perception and imagery. Vertical
bars denote 0.95 confidence intervals.
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that is, the illusion intensity was the same in perception and
imagery (Figure 4). All results showed a stable effect of illusion,
independent of gender or modality.
EXPERIMENT 2
The factor Gender produced inconsistent results in the two
analyses performed in Experiment 1. This factor was significant
in the analysis that closely resembles a psychophysical matching
task, where gender differences are usually not observed.
Experiment 2 was designed to further explore the issue of
gender differences. We again used the horizontal-vertical illusion,
but now tested three different stimulus sizes.
METHOD
Participants
Eleven male and eleven female students of Psychology took
part in the experiment. All of them had normal or corrected
to normal vision and were naïve regarding the experimental
hypotheses. They received course credit for their participation
and signed consent form prior to the beginning of the
experiment.
Stimuli
The horizontal-vertical illusion was constructed in three sizes: 31
mm, 51 mm and 67 mm (visual angle: 2◦, 3.4◦, 4.5◦). Lines were
1 mm wide. Stimuli were placed on a white background (129 ×
94 mm, visual angle: 10.4◦× 7.6◦). Each of the three illusions was
presented ten times during the experiment.
Control stimuli (pseudo-illusions and distractors) were also
constructed in three different sizes (Table 4). Each control stimuli
was presented twice in the experiment.
Scale
To accommodate the change in stimuli size introduced in this
experiment, a new scale with 16 vertical lines was used for
matching. The shortest line was 19 mm, and the longest line was
79 mm, with each line being 4 mm longer than the previous.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Control analysis did not reveal any response strategies and the
attention task was successful (participant had 87% or more
correct responses). Therefore the data from all of the participants
entered the main analysis.
A four-way ANOVA with the following factors was used:
Modality (perception/imagery), Gender (male/female),
Stimuli size (small/medium/large) and Line position
(horizontal/vertical). Results are summarized in Table 5.
The most interesting result is a significant 3-way interaction
between Stimuli size, Modality and Gender, indicating that
depending on the size, male and female participants produced
different matches in perception and imagery task (Figure 5).
Male participants estimated size equally in perception and
imagery task, and Scheffe’s test showed that there was no
significant difference in perception and imagery for any stimulus
FIGURE 5 | Three-way interactions in the analysis of size in
Experiment 2. Results show clear difference between male (left) and
female (right) participants in the two tasks (depicted by the two lines
on the graph). The discrepancy between the two task increases on the
right graph with stimuli size. Vertical bars denote 0.95 confidence
intervals.
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Table 4 | Size of lines for pseudo-illusion and distractor stimuli (in millimeters).
Small Medium Large
Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal
Stim. series Pseudo-illusions
1 35 31 55 51 71 67
2 31 27 51 47 67 63
3 35 27 55 47 71 63
4 39 27 59 47 75 63
5 39 31 59 51 75 67
Distractors
1 31 35 51 55 63 71
2 27 39 55 51 67 71
3 31 39 51 59 63 75
size. For female participants, there was no significant difference in
the perception and imagery tasks for small stimuli, but differences
appeared for medium (Scheffe test, p < 0.003) and large stimuli
sets (Scheffe test, p< 0.000). Figure 5 shows that those differences
increased with increasing stimulus size.
The non-significant 4-way interaction Stimuli size ∗ Line
position ∗ Modality ∗ Gender is also theoretically interesting.
It provides an additional insight into the phenomena, revealing
that the significant 3-way interaction (Stimuli size ∗ Modality ∗
Gender) is the same for both lines, horizontal and vertical. This
probably means that the illusion strength is independent of other
factors.
Since other significant 2-way interactions are already included
in higher order 3- and 4-way interactions, they will not be
separately described. However, it is important to the main effects.
First the main effect of Line position, showed the existence of the
basic illusion: vertical lines were estimated as longer. Stimuli size,
confirmed the effect of physical size: lager stimuli were estimated
as larger. The lack of a significant main effect of Modality
confirmed our main hypothesis: in general, there is no significant
difference in perception and imagery. Differences could only be
observed in interaction with other factors (Gender and Stimuli
size). The non-significant effect of Gender is in contradiction with
the results we obtained in Experiment 1 but is in accordance with
the psychophysical matching task.
DISCUSSION
In this study we focused on a comparison between perception
and mental imagery. This relationship is at the heart of a long
debate that either equates imagery to perception, postulating
that mental images are (1) like percepts; (2) involve similar
process; and (3) the same brain areas or that suggests that “the
process of imagistic reasoning involves the same mechanisms
and the same forms of representation as are involved in general
reasoning” (Pylyshyn, 2002, p.158). The debate was aimed to
resolve one of the major questions of cognitive psychology: the
format of mental representations. Therefore, demonstrating that
the same or similar processes are involved both in perception and
imagery would strongly suggest the existence of same or similar
representations.
Table 5 | Results of ANOVA for variable estimation.
Factors df df F p-level
Modality 1 202 1.71 0.193
Gender 1 202 1.93 0.166
Stimuli size 2 404 1384.43 0.000∗
Line position 1 202 1353.44 0.000∗
Modality * gender 1 202 45.46 0.000∗
Stimuli size * modality 2 404 19.08 0.000∗
Stimuli size * line position 2 404 30.52 0.000∗
Stimuli size * gender 2 404 0.02 0.980
Line position * modality 1 202 1.28 0.259
Line position * gender 1 202 2.23 0.137
Line position * modality * gender 1 202 0.62 0.432
Stimuli size * modality * gender 2 404 8.80 0.0001∗
Stimuli size * line position * modality 2 404 1.09 0.338
Stimuli size * line position * gender 2 404 0.80 0.451
Stimuli size * line position
* modality *gender 2 404 0.50 0.606
* p < 0.01.
Although there has been relatively little behavioral research
comparing directly perception and imagery though for an
overview of earlier work, see the seminal paper by Finke and
Shepard (1986), numerous results from neuroscience support the
view that perception and imagery are based on similar processes.
Our research hypotheses were inspired by those results. This study
aimed to explore the similarity of perception and imagery, but
using behavioral methodology, i.e., processing of visual illusions.
We considered several flaws in the reported literature and
tried to resolve most of the methodological issues. A simple
experiment with clearly separated imagery and perception tasks
was conducted, applying the same size-measurement technique
in both cases. Simple, non-ambiguous illusory figures were used,
answering strategies were controlled, the influence of afterimages
was prevented, and data for both high- and low-imagers were
collected. A possible influence of the experimenter’s expectation
or suggestion was almost completely reduced.
Introducing two control sets of stimuli provided an important
advantage in our experiment. It allowed us to identify reasons
for failure to experience an illusion, and to exclude participants
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that used answering strategies, both in perception and imagery. By
controlling all conditions in the experiment, we avoided possible
misinterpretation of imagery results, allowing us to conclude that
illusions can be experienced in imagery.
In the first experiment we demonstrated that the horizontal-
vertical illusion could be created in imagery. A specific type of
variable, the difference between the lines, enabled us to determine
the precise size of the illusory effect in imagery and to compare it
with typical perceptual results. Our findings revealed that there
was no significant difference in perception and imagery—the
difference between the horizontal and vertical line was the same
for perception and imagery. Thus, our results support some of
the previously reported results, for example Wallace’s findings
(Wallace, 1984a,b).
In this study we also obtained the first quantitative measure
of illusion size in imagery. This measure was independent of
participants’ judgments on the equality of lines, so the results
were not influenced by instruction and experimenter expectation,
which was one of the main flaws in previous studies (Wallace,
1984a,b; Reisberg and Morris, 1985). This kind of measurement
enabled us to compare size in perception and imagery directly.
There might be another important source of difference in
measured size between the two tasks that is not a consequence
of imagery but the underlying memory processes. Imagery tasks
by definition involve memory and memory representations might
be noisier or lower resolution than those created in perception
(Bartlett, 1932; but see also Potter, 1976). Furthermore, details
and elements in memory are always likely to be subject
to a certain degree of decay (Ebbinghaus, 1964). In the
Introduction we also mentioned other more sophisticated
memory effects. One such effect is boundary extension that
leads an observer to “remember seeing more of a scene than
was shown” (Intraub et al., 1996). This research specifies that
the effect only involves scene perception, creating activation
in para-hippocampal place area (PPA) and retrosplenial cortex
(RSC), but never in the areas involved in object perception,
i.e., lateral occipital complex (LOC; Park et al., 2007). This
implies that boundary extension affects view-boundaries and not
object-boundaries (Gottesman and Intraub, 2003). Furthermore,
Gottesman and Intraub (2002, 2003) offer an explanation
of boundary extension that relies on amodal perception and
in that respect is unlikely to apply to our, fully presented,
stimuli. Finke et al. have found similar memory distortions
in the dynamic domain (e.g., Freyd and Finke, 1984). As
all of our stimuli were static, and did not imply motion,
we would not expect these dynamic effects to occur. Finally,
our results are very systematic in both the perceptual and
imagery domains, never revealing any of the differences suggestive
of memory representation biases. Our Figures 3 and 5, for
example, directly compare magnitude estimation for the same
line presented in perception and retrieval from memory in the
imagery task. This is further confirmed by the non-significant
statistical tests in a variety of conditions (factor Modality,
Tables 2, 3, 5). As we essentially found no differences between
performance measured in our two tasks, it seems unlikely
that memory processes are significantly modulating the current
results.
While we were analyzing size and the distribution of results, we
noticed that female participants performed somewhat differently
in imagery. This was a tendency, not a significant result. Although
this is not a typical finding for cognitive tasks we did obtain
similar results in one previous imagery study (Stojanovic´ and
Zdravkovic´, 2007). Thus we designed a second experiment with
the aim of further exploring gender differences in size, in both
perception and imagery. The measuring scale and stimuli sets
were adapted in order to provide more precision.
The second experiment confirmed the main results of the
first experiment: there was no significant difference between
perception and imagery in illusion intensity. Also, there were no
gender differences in illusion intensity. But the second experiment
gave us further insight into the nature of the phenomena of
mental imagery. Although the illusion is the same strength in both
modalities, it appears that the size of the images in perception
and mental images are not the same for both genders. Male
participants perform equally in perception and imagery for all
stimuli sizes. But female’s estimation depended on stimulus size:
there was no significant difference in perception and imagery
for small stimulus size (which were comparable to those used in
Experiment 1), but there were increasing differences for medium
and large stimuli. In other words, female tend to underestimate
the size in imagery and this tendency increased with increasing
stimulus size.
Our results concerning the relationship between perception
and imagery are fully in accordance with those of Kosslyn
et al. (1997, 1999, 2001); Ganis et al. (2004). In his theory,
Kosslyn (2005) proposed that mental imagery and perception
are based on similar underlying cognitive components, and
postulates six major systems involved in perception and imagery:
visual buffer, attention window, processing object properties
vs. spatial properties, associative memory, information shunting
and attention shifting system. A possible explanation for our
results might relate to properties of the associative memory
system. Kosslyn argued that both propositional and analog
representations are placed in associative memory, while images
in the visual buffer are pictorial in nature. That implies that
both types of information, pictorial and verbal, are used in
the process of imagery. Thus, we can suppose that difference
between male and female in imagery could be a consequence
of different ratios of pictorial and verbal elements for specific
object in associative memory. Since the mental image of male
participants is “equal” to the image in perception, it can
be assumed that they use more pictorial information during
imagery. Conversely, female participants may rely more on
verbal descriptions. Therefore, female participants’ tendency to
reduce image size in imagery could be a result of an energy
saving strategy: since verbal descriptions are used, forming a
smaller image uses less energy and memory capacity. However,
those explanations are purely hypothetical and demand further
empirical exploration.
Cognitive abilities research supports the view of gender
differences in spatial ability. Meta-analysis of gender differences in
spatial abilities has shown that male participants perform better
in mental rotation, spatial perception and spatial visualization
(Voyer et al., 1995). Some later results suggest that male
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outperform female participants on spatial-ability tests, although
differences within groups are larger than between groups (Weiss
et al., 2003a). Moreover, Weiss et al. fMRI study showed
different brain activation during their mental rotation task:
male participants showed stronger parietal activation, while
female participants showed greater right frontal activation (Weiss
et al., 2003b). Our own previous research is inconsistent:
sometimes we found differences (Stojanovic´ and Zdravkovic´,
2007) and sometimes we did not (C´irovic´ and Zdravkovic´,
2011).
Based on those findings, we can suppose that male and
female participants perform differently on spatial tasks, including
imagery, but further research in this area should include more
specified and detailed imagery tasks.
CONCLUSION
Analyzing participants’ size estimations enabled us to measure
illusion in imagery. Moreover, it enabled us to explore some
of the main characteristics of mental images. This approach
helped us to test our initial hypothesis, so we demonstrated
that illusion could occur in imagery. In addition, we found that
illusion intensity is the same in perception and imagery. Although
we found no significant difference in illusion intensity, gender
differences appeared in mental images: female participants tend
to make images of the smaller spatial format compared to images
in perception. However, the origin of those differences cannot be
explained within our study, but require further exploration.
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